Turkish foreign policy from the creation of the Republic in 1923, up until the end of the Second World War, aimed to preserve friendly relations with the Soviet Union, to restore normal relations with France and Great Britain (which culminated in a defensive aııiance with the United Kingdom and France in 1939) and to resume friendly relations with Germany.1 Diplomatic and economic relations betwecn the United States and Turkey were negligible throughout this period.
Historically, U.S. economic interets in Turkey had never been significanL American entrepreneurs' failure to raise capital to carry out railroad and mineral development projects for the Turkish Government in 1923, had marked the end of major U .S. economic involvement in *This is a revised version of an M.A. Thesis, presented to the Department of History, University College London, 1997. i Harris, George, Troubled Alllance. Turkish American Problems In "istorical Perspective, 1945 -71.Washington D.C., 1972 However, the Second World War brought significant changes to Turkey's alliances with the Wesl. In an effort to remain outside the war, Turkey maintained a position of neutrality, aIbeit LO the discontentrnent of Britain, France, and Russia. Relations with the Soviet Union reached its lowest ebb with the Soviet denouncement in March 1945 of the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between the two countries, and calls for rectification's on the north-Eastern border of Turkey in addition to demands for a base on the Straits. 3 Throught the Second World War, Turkey had received mililary aid from Britaain, under the defensiye alliancc, and had also bcen able to obtain $95m worth of mililary aid under the lend-lease from the United States. Aid under the lend-lease agrecment ended once the war was over however, which left Turkey dependent upon British aid. Although Turkey had remained outside the war, her economy had suffered considerably as a resull. The maintenance of a standing army of over one million men betwccn ı939-ı945 had negatiye efects on her productive capacity, internal consumption had been limited and export capabilities had suffered restrictions. Although the war had not altered her economic structure, Turkey's foreign markets, principally Germany and various other European countries were unable to buy her produce. The Icveling out of the prices of exports to their pre-war levels added an additional strain to Turkey's economy. On the other hand, Turkey continued to maintain a large standing army, in the aftermath of the war, fearing war with Russia, while she tried to resume economic development plans which had bcen suspcnded as a consequence of the war. Throughout the war, Turkey had been able to accumulate $245m in gold an foreign exchange reserves, however, she was unwilling to use her reserves fearing a war with the Soviet Union, and therefore sought to obtain internal loans and foreign credits. 4
Russian pressures resulıed in Turkish efforts to involve the United States in her defence against the Soviet Union. Washington had not shown immediate reaction to Soviet pressures on Turkey, fearing it would jcopopardise the peace process. However, Turkish efforts proved successful in the backround of the sharp deterioration of Soviet-American relations in early 1946. Turkey was thus able to receiye the backing of both Britain and the 2Ibld., p. ıo. 3Ibıd., pp. 6-8. 40laylarla Türk Dış Politikası 1919 -1965 , Ankara, 1969 
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United States in the rejection of Soviet demands in September 1946. At the same time, Turkey actively sought economic aid from the United States. Turkey's request for $300m from the Import-Export Bank at the end of 1945, was rejected, and it was not until November 1946 that she was able to obtain $50m, against her inİtial request of S500m, which she found far from satisfying. Agreement was also reached betwcen the United States and the United Kingdom whereby the latter would continue to be the chief supplier of weapons while the form er would provide economic assistance. 5
Turkey increasingly found herself tuming towards the U.S. for military as weII as economic aid as a result of difficulties with the British on the mattcr. United States aid was not immediately forthcoming however. Turkey fought hard for aid from the U.S., emphasising her strategic importance in fending off a possible Russian attaek. Yet, American policy makers found it difficult to justify extensive economic aid to Turkey. Joint American and British resistance to Soviet territorial claims on Turkey in September 1946, had eased off Soviet pressures. Both British and American govemments believed that there was no imminent danger on Turkey from the Soviet's and that Soviet policy was aimed to keep Turkey up in anns and thus to kecp her weak economicalIy.
The question of formal American assistance arose following the British declaration in early 1947 that she no longer was able to extend aid to Greece and Turkey. The American administration believed that extension of aid to Turkey was desircd for psychological rcasons, and a fear that she might tum to the Soviet Union if she thought her westem a!liances were not strong enough. 6 Given the sound economic, financia! and political conditions of Turkey, the administration found it difficult to justify that the Turkish case constituted an emergeney. The most effective argument the administration could use in public to justify aid to Turkey under the Truman Doctrine was to put forward the idea that Turkey was unable to sustain industrial devel~ment under her present obligation to maintain such a large standing anny. Undersecratary of State Dean Acheson was compelIed, on the other hand, to acknowledge the strategic motivations behind the U.S. initiative in the Congressional hearings. 1984-85, pp. 807-825. [VOL. XXVII spccifically to the urgency of the Greek situation, while Turkey was only marginally mentioncd. It was agreed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff that aid to Turkey involved political, cconomic and psychologicaI as primary factors as oppased to the military factor. 9 Turkey rccived a grant of $ 100 million under the Truman Doctrine in the summer of 1947, for the purposes of military development. The U.S. held that Turkey's international credit position was sufficiently favourabIe for Turkey to be abIe to obtain foreign financial assistance for sound economic development projects from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. 10 The Turkish government also wanted the inclusion of credits under the programme, as this was essential to sustain her defence efforts. ll Yet the American administration believed that the aid under the Truman Doctrine covered Turkey's requirements. The Mission under General Lunsford Oliver, sent to Turkey from May to June 1947 to assess her needs, had proposed that Turkey should receiye military aid for a pcriod of five years, af ter which she was expected to become self-sufficient. It was also noted that, due to her low level of economic development, Turkey would be unable to absorb a high rate of investment. 12
Marshall Aid, offered to those countries who had suffered damage as a result of the war, was not designed to mcet Turkey's requirements. Turkey's desire to obtaain financial assistance from the US left her with the problem of how to. The Turkish government took particular interest in what was going on in Paris in this regard. The French Ambassador to Ankara had remarked 'what the Turks were interested in, was not what we were doing with our American credits, it was the procedure with which we obtained thern', referring to the Monnet Plan which Ankara saw as the key to French reception of American credits. 13
In the initial Committee for European Economic Co-operation (CEEC) report, Turkey submitted a five year economic development programme, under which she requested $615m in foreign aid, which was rejected on the grounds that Marshall Aid did not constitute a national development programme, but aimed at the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. The report further indicated that Turkey's economy and exports being overwhelmingly based on agriculture, would necessitate her recovery programme to concentrate upon the development of the agricultural sector, rather than the industrial sector. The report indicated that industrial development could only be realised once productivity and mechanisation in agriculture was pursued. Turkey's estimate of a 30% increase in wheat was put dow n to a more realistic Icvel of 10%. Assuming the supply of mining equipment, American technicians estimated a possible increase of 50% in productivity of the mines. Estimated level of exports for the fiscal year 1948-49 was $270m (slight increase from previous year), of which 45% would be exported to the ERP countries, while the US would be purchasing 10-15% of Turkish exports. The report concluded that even though Turkey's volume of exports would not be able to meet a substantial amount of Europe's requirements, Turkey was seen to be in a position whereby she could contribute to European recovery.
Washington also indicated that Turkey would be abi e to meet her requirements of machinery under the ERP through purchases, in the first 15 months, based on her gold and foreign exchange reserves. Turkey strongly objected to not being allocated grants and pointed out the inconsistency of placing Turkey in the same category as Switzerland and Portugal. 'Turkey would need many years before she could eve n reaeh the stage of European countries in their present state of destruction and damage'. Turkey also disputed the fact that she possessed sufficient foreign exchange reserves to mcet her requirements under the ERP. The refusal of direct grants within Marshall Aid created considerable political reaction in Turkey. Foreign Minister Sadak had expressed his 'profound disappointment' to the American Ambassador regarding the matter. Turkey felt she was entiLled to credits under Marshall Aid and considered it unjust that she was excluded whilc those countries, like Belgium and Holland, who were much more development economically and industrially were receiving crcdits. 20
The feeling within Turkey, that the govemment had not bcen able to put its case forward adequately at the Paris Conference was not too far from the truth either. 21 There had appeared several articles in the press, blaming the govemment for il,>inability in defending Turkey's case and consequently putting the blame on the govemment for Turkey not being ablc to obıain US credits as other governments. 22 However, littıc was known within Turkey about her position and the requirements of the ERP as the govemment had not kept the public informed from the initial stages of the negotiations through to the Paris Conference. As a result, there also had developcd a general sense of feeling that the govemment had shown a lack of interest towards Marshall Aid and that Turkey was being ignorcd by the American government. 23 16Thobie, op.clt., p. 566. 17public Record Office, (hercafter cited as PRO), London, F0371n2541, Somerville Smith, Treasury Chambers, 28 February, 1948 . 18lbid., F0371n2541, C. T. Crowc, 2 March, 1948 ı9Ayın Tarıhı, Turkish Foreign Minister Sadak's Address to the Parliament, February 1948 , p. 32. 20FRUS, 1948 , ılı. Wilson to Lovetl, 15 January 1948 . p. 363. 21pRO, F0371n2541, Somerville Smith, 28 February 1948 . 22Nadir Nadi, Cumhuriyet, 25 January 1948 , pp. 91-93. 23Nadir Nadi, Cumhuriyet, 2 February 1948 The Turkish government's reaction to the terms of Turkey's participation under the ERP, was pcrceived by the United States as primarily resulting from misconceptions of the purpose and nature of the ERP.24 However the US did acknowledge that Turkey's foreign trade balance was running strictly in deficit, which had reached up to $26m with the US and $3.5m with other American countries, with a trade surplus with nonparticipating countries (in the ERP) of only $5.5m, by 1948. 25 The extent of Turkish reaction was partly attributed to Turkey's worries over the formation of a new Czechoslovak govemment under Communist Icadership. The state department therefore considered the question whether it would be necessary to provide her more generously under the ERP, for the want of keeping Turkey on its present course of political path, if not from a strictly economic point of view. 26
The tentalive recovery allocation of $lOm to Turkey for the first year of the ERP was received with great disappointment by Turkey, espccially since Turkey had estimated that S lOm might be available in the first quarter. Foreign Minister Sadak informed Ambassador Wilson on 5 May 1948 that the cabinet had decided not to accept the ten million credit on the basis that the govemment would consider its position stronger domestically if it declined the Recovery Programme a<; it would draw most serious attacks from the opposition and press, in the light of Turkey's international position and needs. Sadak also put forward the argument that Turkey would be unable to make effectiye contribution to European recovery with only $lOm credil. By accepting therefore, Turkey would obligate herself to do something which in fact she would be unable to. 27
Under pressure of Turkish reasoning, Washington agreed to extend Turkey $lOm in credits, as a first instalment, between April and July to which a further $39m was added for the Fiscal Year commencing in June. The Turkish government signed the Bilateral Agreement with the United States on 4 July 1948, af ter having examined the text of the agreement against any dauses which might indicate the concession of capitulatory privileges. 28 The extent of the govemment's anxiety over the issue reflected itself over the suppression of the publication of the Bilateral Agreement in Turkish newspapcrs by order of the cabinet, who had issued repeated official Under the Bilateral Agreement betwcen Turkeyand the United States, Turkey pledged to prevent practices that might restrain competition, limit access, or foster monopolistic control, and to undertake the reduction in barriers to both domestic and foreign trade. Alıhough the Bilateral Agrcement did not escape criticism, critics were few in number, and the Marshall Plan was welcomed by a large majority of the elite and the masses. Critics of the Left condemned the agreement as reviving the capitulations, characterising the United States for aiming to exploit Turkey's resources as a colony while the Right-wing accused the United States government in pursuing a 'fullfledged open door policy'. Yet, for the majority, Turkey's eligibility to receiye concessionary aid itself was a source of satisfaction. Neither did the fact that assistance was being extended in the form of loans raıher than outright grants raise great eriticism. No doubt the long term repayment period of 35 years, and the 2.5% interest rate played its part. 30
Reactions to Turkish participation in the ERP is perhaps best demonstrated in Jacques Thobie's statement that 'the French government could not but approve of Turkey's accession into Marshall Aid, on the condition however that aid to Turkey remained moderate'.31 lt was felt that there was not enough ERP assistance to go around, particularly in the form of grants-in-aid, and although Turkey was considered to be an important element in the ERP, her role was not considered to be any more important than the other participants. The British felt that any increase in Turkey's share of ERP assistance would be at the expense of others, and in particular at the expense of the United Kingdom. The British also felt that Turkey had done well during the war. In addition, it was, after all, the State Departrnents intention that Turkey should receiye additional assistance for military purposes, which therefore made them less inclined to be too sympathetic to the Turkish laments. Nevertheless, on further investigation, if the Turks could prove that their posilion was very much more serious than had been made out, it was pointed out there could be no objections for the Americans to look up at Turkish case more sympathetically.32 The French, on their part, were also unconvinced of Turkish complaints over the modesty of the sum of aid thcy wcre allocated. In her efforts to obtain aid, Turkey largely depended upon the argument that military expenditures exerted an overwhelming burden on her economy. While bcfore the war, the men under arms numbered 100,000 in the winter and 180 000 in the summer, this number was raised to 500/600,000 immediately af ter the war. However by mid-1949, the numbers were down to 330,000, which was thought unlikely to see an increase. There was scepticism over Turkish claims that this exerted an overwhelming burden on the manpower resources of the country. However, it was also recognised that the mechanisation of the army under the Americans would increase the financia! burden. 34 Turkey nevertheless continued to emphasise her military burden, which she indicated to as being a burden that she was having to shoulder despite the fact that she had no responsibility in causing the present situation of the division between the East and the West. 35 Turkey also pointed out that although the rest of the ERP countries were receiving a much larger proportion of aid under the Marshall Plan, they did not show as great an interest in matters of common defence as it was their belief that the Cold War was largelyan economic affair as opposed to a military undertaking. This line of thought was also thought to be confirmed with the US Secretary of State's declaration that European militarisation should only be undertaken as far as the economies of the individual countries allowed. 36 Turkey's preference in pursuing diplomatic channels in Washington to sccure increases in her ERP allocations, as opposed to the OEEC, drew considerable reaction from both the Americans and the British. In an exchange of views betwecn the United States Ambassador in Ankara and Sir D. Kelly, the British Ambassador in Ankara, the American Ambassador had expressed his annoyance wilh the Turkish attitude regarding the OEEC and particularly with Mr. Summer, Minister in charge of these matters and the then Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs: Similarly, Sir Kelly reported that LheSecretary General of the Foreign Office had repeatedly complained to him, insisting on the absurdity to criticise Turkey's plans when allocation was so small and bore no relation to Turkey's strategie importance and vulnerability. Sir Kelly's attempts to convinee the Secretary General that this was not the right approaeh as the fundamental of the Marshall Plan was mutual aid and not comparative military and politieal value of eountries concemed, was 'without much sueeess,.38
This attitude may explain, to a eertain extent, the 'Iaek of intcrest' the Turkish Government showed towards the Marshall Plan. Mr. Wilds, the Grcek-Turkish Aid Programme Co-ordinator, had complained that the Turkish govemment failed to aet in time and precision regarding the prepartion of the economie programmes, thaL the balance of payments figures were entirely imaginary and ineonsistent, and that the requested information was not handed in on time, which eauscd delays in the implementation of the programme. 39
The Turkish Long Term Proı,rramme was seen to be far too ambitious, and that Turkey, like Portugal, was deserihed to have put forward an ideal development programme for the next fifteen to twenty years raLher than a realistic assesment of what was likely to he achieved by i952/53. 40 The examination of the Turkish Long Term Programme by Somerville Smith and the Commercial Counsellor in Ankara, is revealing in the nature of its comments as it gives a good indication of Turkish attempts to re-direct their reeovery plans in line wiLh the European Co-operation Administration's (ECA) views over the development of the agricultural sectar as opposed to the development in industry, with an aim to ineease produetion for the purpose of exports. It also reveals the extenL of Turkish anxiety over the neeessity of rapid development, but also shows the laek of professionaJ planning over her schemes. Under her Long Tenn Programme, Turkish request for a large number of hcavy tractors to produce an exportable surplus of 200,000 tons of only bread grain was seen as illogical and unrealistic; it was believed that any number excecding ı500 heavy tractors over a pcriod of five years could not be digestcd. Turkish estimates of a production of 4,750,000 tons of bread grains, was defined as 500,000 lons too high eve n under favourable conditions. As regards long tenn production, an increase of more ıhan 50% was also tenncd as unduly optimistic, while the ıhoughı of a parallel increase in consumpıion, 'unbelievable'.41 Subsequent problcms of replacemenı and maintancnce, and lhe difficuILies of obtaining machinery for lhe irrigaıion schemes which would necessarily play an important part in the expansion programme had noı been laken into consideration. Similarly, the question of large quantiıies of fertilisers had not bccn fully explored. AILhough there were plans for increased supplies of nitrogen, no refcrence was made to phosphates and potash which were al most as equally important. Similarly, the report indicated to the ili defined nature of the quesıion of grazing land. The difficulty in drawing a distinction between grazing, forest and cultivaıed land in Turkey resuILed to any mention of increase in grazing land lo be viewed with suspicion. ILwas ıhought better to concentrate on inercasing the yield of, and perhaps creating pastures. However, it was not regarded as a spectacular project, showing quick and immediate resulıs, and ıherefore did not receiye much attention. 42 As regards the fishing secıor, there were doubts as to wheıher it would be possible to increase the cateh to the propose d level by ı952/53, or whether markets could casily be found even if the cateh was incrcased. Similarly, projecıs for power stations and estimaıes of production Icvels of oil and petroleum were found lo be over-optimistic. Proposed project for an increase in nitrogen, were found unlikely to be realiscd in four years, due to the shortage of equipment. Turkish projects for iron and steel production, were advised to be treated outside the long tenn programme.43
Comments made by the delegation from the International Bank for Recontruction and Development also throws light on Turkey's developmenı projects.
44 The IBRD had put forward that the export of agricultural produce, espccially fmit and fishing, should have priority over grandiose projects -the aim being to utilisc what was at hand. The delegation had also concluded that extreme statism had intimidated the private sector, consequently the private sector engaged in the buying and selling of commodities as opposed to invesLing in profitable projects. It was therefore adviscd that staLism should be reduced and action should be taken to encourage the private enterprise. Again, problcms had emerged with regard to certain projects due to a lack of communication between various government departments, which was also found to be responsible for the economy's staLic state. Finally, with regard to the gmnLing of credits, it was advised that the fırst party should be uscd in the public sector, and the second party for use in the private sector. The ECA had also indicated the need to take action to ease foreign investment in Turkey. According to the ECA, the undefined boundaries of the state and the difficulty in exporting the dividends of capital and profits, rendered American investment less forthcoming in Turkey. Difficulties had also been encountered by commercial insLitutions in their efforts to conduct business with the govemment authorities as well as individual businessmen, due to delays in taking action or the lack of follow up of proposals. 45
These and other comments had much effect in the revision of Turkey's Long Term Programmc. The Turkish Programmc, in its final form thus reflected ECA's vision of development in Turkey. DetaiIcd projects were drawn up under Nurullah Esat Sümer, the Turkish Minister in charge of the Marshall Plan, with strict collaboration of Henry Wiens, deputy assistant of the head of the ECA Mission in Turkey, and with Russell Dorr, the Mutual Security Programme Administrator. 46
The Turkish economy policy, as defined in the Long Term Programme aimed at the rational exploitation of natural resources, intersification and improvement of agriculture, exploitation of power resources on a rational basis and the development of the means of communications. Raising of the standard of living also constitutcd one of the major aims. Finally, the programme aimed to sustain national efforts through a large influx of foreign capital. 47
Emphasis was given to agricultural production, concentrating efforts on the achievement of its mechanisation, and on irrigation and reclaiming project. The mechanisation programmc, aimed at the utilisation of Turkey's vast arable space s with the agricultuml equipment and machinery that would be providcd under the ERP. The estimated number of tractors required were stated to be a minimum of 5500 -e1early much larger than what the BriLish thought was viable, whieh indieates the extent to whieh the ECA emphasised agrieulture. The aim was to reclaim and exploit a surfaee of 1,800,000 heetares of land. The irrigation and reclaiming programme was aıready under way and the Long-Term Programme aimed to fulfil these two programmes, in irrigating 50,000 heetares and improving 48,700 heetares, and reclaiming 170,000 heetares of land. The eredits whieh were required for this purpose was estimated at S56m, of whieh an extra $6m of extemal financing would be required for irrigation plans.
Inereases in produetion of bread, eoarse grains, fats and oils, meat and sugar as well as that of pulse plants and other food produets, fibres and other raw matcrials, were aimed at, through an inerease in eultivated areas (it was estimated that there were more than 9m heetares of land to rcelaim), and through the use of improved agrieultural and breeding methods.
Under her Long-Term Programme, Turkeyaimed to reaeh a produetion level of approximately 6,340,000 tons of bread grains and 3,600,000 tons of eoarse grain, out of whieh 700,000 tons or more of eereals would be for export. Again, these lcvels showed a stark contrast to British estimates of what was possible. Again, Turkeyaimed to inerease the produetion of pulses from 300,000 tons to a yearly production of 400,000 tons, with the possibility of exporting 100 000 tons. Increases in oil and oil eake would allow Turkey to export 80,000 and 70,000 tons respeetively through an extension of cultivation. As for meaat production, Turkey primarily aimed al an inerease of meal consumption per capila whieh was very low. it was nevertheless, estimated that production might reaeh to 218,000 tons in 1952-53, which would allow for 60,000 tons in exports. Both the meat and the fish industries were to undergo large sealc re-equipment whieh would allow the eXPort of 75,000 tons of fish to European countries. Sugar production too was required to meet an increase in demand due to the growing population, and Turkeyaimed to ensure the country's requirements were met as far as possible by national produetion. An inerease from 125,000 tons in 1947, to 200,000 tons of raw sugar was estimated for 1952.
The Long-Term Programme also emphasised the produetion of textiles and fibres, whieh would be aimed at exports. Increase in colton production was estimated to rise from 55,000 tons in 1948, of which 15,000 tons would be exportable, ıo a total of 90,000 tons in 1952, of which 35,000 lons would be exported. Increases in hemp production amounting to 32,000 were also primarily envisaged for export purposes. Wool production was aimed at 47,000 tons, of which 15,000 tons would be exported.
Development of power resourees came second to agrieulture in the Long-Te rm Programmc, with great emphasis given to electric power station s and coal produetion. Development projects prepared by Turkish engineers in collahoration with American engineers, included the Zonguldak coal field on the Black Sea Coast, with an aim to increase production and output, and export up to 760,000 tons of coat. Several brown coal concerns, mainly those in Değirmisaz, Soma and Tunçbilek, were placed under equipment programmes with an aim to provide Westem Turkey with solid fuel extracted on the spot, without having to transport coal from Zonguldak, to produce cheap thermic power for consumption centres to regulate hydraulic power station s, and to substitute brown coal for firewood for home consumption and thus save timber recourses. Under the equipment programme, Tunçbilek's production levels were anticipated to rise from 700,000 to 1,000,000 tons a year, while Soma and Değirmisaz production levels together would permit a production of 1,000,000 tons a year as from 1950.
Turkey had already prepared part of her e1ectrification programme, under which the Çatalağzı thermic power station, supplied by coal from the Zonguldak basin was ready to work. The 1948-52 programme aimed at the installation of Tunçbilek electric power station which would supply current to the nitrogen industry to be installed in the area, the mine, and the İzmit and İstanbul areas.
Plans for the the installation of hydraulic electric power station at Çağlayık and Kadıncık, installation of high tension lines to carry suplus power from the electric power station all Tunçbilek to İzmir and İstanbul, bctween Çağlayık, Ankara and KlOkkale and betwccn Çatalgazi and Karabük to provide for the power requirements of the Karabük blast fumaces and steel plant were also drawn up. The second stage of the programme aimed to connect these high tension Iines with those of other electric power stations.
Increases in iron are production at Divrik were estimated from 180,000 tons to 500,000 tons per annum from 1951, which would allow for a considerable surplus for export purposes.
Although the Long Term Programme indicated that oil consumption would increase from $25m to $40m worth of imports, and pointed to the existence to Turkey's fairly abundant oil reserves in the South-East, no projects were mentioned with respect to this field, while it was mentioned that outside finance would be necessary to continue prospecting and to open up these reserves.
In the industrial field, Turkey was a new country, and procduction levels did not meet the country's needs. Equipment schemes were drawn up within the textile industry, of which the fırst part would be carried out in two years, with an aim to reduce textile imports by $40m annualy. Expansion within the cellulose industry had already bccn started, which required extemal aid amounting to $3.7m. The cement industry on the other hand, faced a production deficit of 600,000 tons, being unable to meet internal consumptian requirements. Projccts aimed at expanding the industry were estimated to absorb S8m of foreign financing. Great importance was also given to the chemical industry, which would specialise in producing nitrogenous fertilisers that were esscntial for an increased agricultural yield.
The output of iron and stecl industry covered only 40% of the national demand. it wa,>estimated, LhaLan expansion of the industry would require an invesLmenL of abouL $42m. Such projcclS, such as the establishment of an organic chemical indusLry, and those of the sodium alkali and inorganic chemical industries had been posLponed under Lhe Long Term Programme until foreign funds could be found Lofinance Lhem, while Lhecarbonate and alkali industries were required essential for their affinity with the oil industry.
CommunicaLions were given a very high priorİly in Lhe programme for iLS importance in providing transport facilities of raw matcrials from industrial centres Lothe consumer market wiLhin the country and abroad. The Icngth of Lhe railways had increased from 3970 km's to 7575. Under the development programme, an addiLional 282 km's were to be construCLed, the number of locamotives and freighL wagons were to be increased, the infrastructure was Lobe improved all of which would ential $40m in foreign finance. The road programme was placed under a nine year programme, divided into stages of Lhrcc years each. Drawn up under American experts, the road programme involved road rcconstrucLion, repair and widening of 23,000 km of a LOtalof 43,000 km of Turkey's road neLwork. The developmenL and construction of ports were put under urgcnt consideration, aL an estimated cost of around S5.3m in foreign funds. The programme pointed to Turkey's over-aged vessels, and indicaLed the necd for an incrcasc in the merchanL fleelS and shipping yards, with an aim to reduce Turkey's annual freight costs. It was estimated thaLforeign funds of SS Im would be rcquired.
Under the developmenL programme, Turkey indicaLed that her commercial policy would be directed towards a system of freer trade, to the extent of which the economic collaboration of the participating countries and the general international sİluation made it possible to increase Lhe country's capaciLy Lopay. Increases in production would be aimed LO contribuLe LoLhis effort. Exports had reached S223.3m in 1947 and was estimated that it would amount to $386.5m in ı952-53. (This would mean exports to the Dollar Area would amount to S56.4m and to SouLh America SL.5m) At the same time Turkey anticapeted an export S58.1 m to participating countries of Sterling Area and an export of Sı83.9m to other participating countries and a remainder of $86.6m to non-participating countries of SLerling Area and others. Turkey thus hoped to export goods which participating countries found İl difficult to obtain, especially mining and agricultural product. Expansion of market,> and modemisation would aim to bring a reducLion in prices. Imports in 1947 had amounted to S244.6m and it was anticipated that in 1952-53 this would rise to S395m-S63.9m from the participating Sterling Arca, and S180.5m from the other participating countries.
Turkey's balance of paymenlS structure differcd markcdly from those of the other countries, the reason being that Turkey had no capital invested abroad, ilS merchant fleet was of no significant size, nor was the tourist industry developcd enough to bring in a large income. Turkey's trade balance for 1952-53, in tourist, transport, profilS and dividends, debt services and other charges, had been estimatcd at $61m on the debit side and only $50.6m on credit side. Thus 1952-53 estimates had been foundcd on the assumption that the four year programme would be fuııy accomplished. Turkeyaimed to overcome her habitual balance of pay men ts deficit through economic expansion, which would increase her export potential by 73% by the end of the Long Term Programme. Although the volume of exports would be closely dependent on harvests, estimates had been bascd on average harveslS.
Finaııy, under the Long Term Programme, Turkey indicatcd that her financial policy would aim to maintain a balanced budget through a reduction in special expcnditure, rationalising administrative machinery, overhauling its fiscal system and mles. lt was neverthelcss remarked that Turkey was compcllcd LO maintain a large number of men under arms which constituted a heavy burden on both the budget and national production.
Turkey did face serious obstacles in the implcmentation of the Long Term Programmc, in particular her efforts to maintain abalanecd budget were in part aggravated by the very conditions imposed upon Turkey by the requirements of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. (OEEC), as weıı as the difficulties she faced with regard to bad harvests. The 1949-50 Turkish programme which came under examination in December 1948 rel1ected these difficulties -Turkey's economic situation had changed from being a creditor in relation to other participanlS in 1948-49 to position whereby she was a debtor in 1949-50. Although the Turkish government anticipated a $97m loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Turkish government held that an increase in aid under the ERP was necessary as a consequence of the need for increased level of imports due to low lcvels of stock and consumption. Turkey also confroned commercial difficulties which had arisen as a result of a faıı in exporlS.
48
Turkey's financial and economic situation had not changed in 1949, and by J une the Americans were becoming anxious about Turkey's financial and monetary position. In a meeting of the ECA representatives, Turkey's situation was summerised as foııows -Turkey had failed to achieve financia1 and monetary stability and her progress was found unsatisfactory. The national debt had increased steadily -even though not absolutely high in comparison with revenue, the national income or other countries, the 1948-48pRO, F0371/71843, OEEC United Kingdom Delegation to Foreign Office, 2 December 1948.
49 increasc was more rapid than usual. Budget had been in deficit for years, and though it constituıed only 10% of ıhe revenue, iı had been conslanl. Although lhe nole issue was well under control, the price level was high and there existed a tendency for it to rise. The Turkish govemments efforts to control this had so far proved ineffeclive. The foreign exchange posiıion, 100, was unsaLİsfacıory, which lhe ECA thought could only be improved through inereasing production for exports. it was pointed out thaı lhe suppression of compensaıion, and exchange arbitrage deals would help to reduce export prices and hence inlemal prices. Yeı ıhere existed doubıs on how inlcrnal finances could be improved. The old income tax sysıem which puı the burden on ıhose whose salaries were known to be benefit of ıhose whose profits were nol known, had been highly unsafisfacıory. The new income-lax sysıem, aimed to release lhe untapped taxable capaciıy in the country, was seen as a sıep in lhe righı direction, but, nevertheless, there was no expeclation of a great revenue as a resull, for a year or so, and it was thoughı thaı iı would Lake some ıime before inspecıors could discover and sıop tax evasion, which was prominenı among the ıstanbul and ızmir merchants.
The ECA also emphasised lhe need of increased efficiency and economies bul from an economic or financial point of view, bul saw great obSlacles for İls achievemenı in Turkey. Namely, the Minisıry of National Defence was seen to have too much power, to ıhe extent that no other department could allack il. The ECA did recognise thaı iı would nol be possible lo expcct great economies from the armed forces. Even if much smailer numbers were kepı in the army, a mechanised force which would necessarily come into being, would be infiniıely more expensive to maintain than lhe presenı non-mechanised forcc. The ECA therefore suggesıed ıhaı conomies would have lo be made elsewhere. For instance, in the Ministry of Labour, where the organisation was laid down rigidly by law, a new law was necessary to allow the abolition of a redundant secıion. Generally, therefore, slow progress was expected from the new fiscal laws and perhaps from the economies, provided ıhat lhe Turkish govemment showed energy, iniıiative and political courage, bul this was also seen as doubtfuı. 49 It was under these circumstances that lhe ECA representatives began lo consider ıhe possibility of providing an incentive for the governmenl's energy and courage by puııing Turkey on a grant basis instead of a loan basis for Marshall dollars. This would mean that she would never have 10 repay the Marshall dollars she received, but it would also mean that she would have 10 put aside counterpart funds. In other words, if she did not put up the Lira equivalent for internal purposes such as monetary slabilisation, or capilal 49pRO.
F0371n7885, Te1cgram from Foreign Office to UK Delegation in Paris, 7 June 1949. development, she would not receive any dollars at alı. 50 By June 1949 the British had also come LO the conclusion that it was in fact a farce to pretend . that the Turkish government could control the Turkish economy to the extent of reducing prices or increasing grain production for exports. Indecd, 1949 had seen a drought, and the Turkish government had considercd importing grain. The British thought that even if it were theoretically possible for the Turks to control their economy, they could not do so in a way which OEEC would approve, as they were not scen to have the necessary experience or economic knowledge. 51
In fact, on July 13, Barlas, the Minister of State for foreign aid, had approached Harriman for a request of sıı 2m ERP funds to Turkey for 1949.
Barlas had put forward the argument that militaey expcnses, amounted to 55% of the Turkish budget expcnditure, comparing it to Bclgium whose was only 8%, and the fact that there existed a balance of payments deficit, and the drought. Hoffman, some time ago, had stated that Turkey's share would amount to S30m. Mr. Barlas, had also expressed his confidence that Harriman's efforts would Icad to an increase in Turkey's share. Barlas was following the footsteps of his predecessor in playing upon the unique strategic position of Turkey. However, this auitude of 'political playfair for sympathy, the complcte absence ...of any mention of OEEC or European cooperation ... coupled with the lack of detailed economic justification in development plans submitted by the Turkish authorities, [had] a decidedly irritating effect on Mr Dorr.' The Turkish government had earlier tried to secure S20m in direct grant from the US government, theatening to cut the Turkish defence budget by half, if aid was not forthcoming, which had failed. Such actions were regardcd as more harmful than helpful to Turkish bid for aid. 52
Despite the enthusiasm shown by Turkish ministers for European cooperation, the British Ambassador in Ankara expressed that it was 'practically impossible to persuade them that the ERP is an experiment in European cooperation rather than a free for all competition to get the biggest possible slice of the "Marshall" cake'. Whether the Turkish govemment expected to receive aid totalling $122m is doubtful, but there existed internal pressures for receiving an amount which the country 'deserved'. Thus Barlas, by demanding the $112m, had laid himself opcn to opposition criticism which in the previous year had fell on Mr Sadak, and Mr Sümer.
The 1949 programme included the request for $30m for consumer goods, which in the case of its faHure, would make it noticeable to the 50lbld., 7 June 1949. 51PRO, F0371177885. 28 June 1949. (Signature illegib1e) S2lMd., British Embassy İstanbul, 13 July 1949. consumer-voter, and such crıtıcısm would potentially be all the more stronger. it was likely that the govemment would try to denect any such criticism toward other such participating counlries, with the infercnce that they had rcceivcd too much. 53
The Democratic Party's elcction victory in May 1950 had aroused hopcs thatthe new govemment would produce marked changes in the Turkish cconomy. Arter all, the DemocralS had foughtthe elections with promises to implement policies that would liberate industry from the control and operation of the state. In oc to ber, wide liberalisation measures had bccn introduced which had freed many imports from quantitative restrictions in accordance with obligations towards the OEEC, as well as measures which simplified the procedure for the liscencing of imports and exports.54 However, liberalisation measures only lasted for a short while, since coupled wilh the DP govemment's policy to pursue high-impacl, showy projects that lacked efficiency only aggravatcd the already existing balance of trade deficil, and led to an incrcase in innation. In 1951, the Turkish govemment proposed to draw upon counterpart funds in order to meet her budget deficil, however without success. It was not until 1953, with the re-introduction of controls that the DP govemment was able to control its balance of trade deficiL 55
Despite her chronic budget deficits, Turkey was also showing remarkable achievements under the Long Term Programmc. The report prepared by Sir Knox Helm, the British Ambassador to Ankara, in March 1952, on the impact of the Marshall Aid programme is a elcar indicator of the major areas of progress. 56 By 1952, the amount of aid rcceived from the United States amounted to some $320m, which excludcd $2.5m under the technical assistance programme and $30m of credits rcceived through the European Payments Union, a total of which exceeded $320m. Out of the $320 of American aid, Turkey had rcceivcd $194m in the form of grants which in tum had generated counterpart funds cqual to TL280m. Out of these counterpart funds, TL184m were relcased by the govemment for expendilure for civilian purposes, the largest share being alloued to agriculture.
The greatest achievement of the Long Term Programme had shown itself in the agricultural sector. A total of S80m was spent on mechanisation and modemisation of agriculture, including farın equipment and machinery, flood control schemes, grain silos, fertilisers, and the improvement of seed 53lbid., Sir N. Charles to Emest Bevin, 13 June 1949. strains. The Technical Assistance Programme also had a great impact upon the success in the field of agriculture. Under the programme, Turkish agriculturists had be en trained in the United States, while American technicians had bcen employed by the Turkish Ministry of Agriculture.
The Report stated that results could already be seen everywhere, even in those areas which were formely most backward and neglected. The comparatively remote provinces of the South East, for example, on the borders of Iraq and Syria, had begun to rcover some of their ancient fcrtility and were coming to life again as com and cotton growing arcas. Towns like Gaziantep and Urfa, which were formerly among the most backward in Turkey, were beginning to thrive, and Adana, in the fertile com and cotton growing plain of the Çukurova which alone possessed a third of the agricultural machinery in Turkey, gaye the impression of being something of a boom town of the Middle West. In this area, the cotton prices of 1950/51 had brought fortunes to same of the big landowners and the pcasants were enjoying a standard of living hitherto unknown to them. Some of the latter had been abI e to buy their own tractors and combine harvesters, and many others belonged to co-opcratives from which such machinery could be hired.
it is true that Turkey did possess same agricultural machinery before the American aid, and not all the tractors that had been acquired had been bought wİlh American money, but on private account. Some 14,000 tractors had been imported on public and privatc account in 1951 alone. Neverthcless, American advice, and technical aid undoubtedly had been a grcat catalyst in Turkish ambitions for economic advancement The Report also concluded that the mechanisation of agriculture had been abundantly justified in terms of production, pointing out to the surplus of 800,000 tons of grain in 1951, of which 300,000 tons were exportcd (1951, was however, an exceptionally good year). Modem implements also enablcd farmers to increase the acreage sown to cotton, having been stimulated by high prices. Consequently, cotton production passed from 58,000 tons in 1948 to over 150,000 tons in 1951, two thirds of which were exported. By 1953, Turkey became, if only briefly, one of the world's largest wheat exporters. However, this success was largely dependent upon beneficiary weather conditions, which took a tum to the opposite in 1954. Encouraging the diversİly of agricultural equipment alsa excessivcly complicated the problem of spare parts. 57
The report also indicated that the expanding population of Turkey from 17m in 1938 to over 21 m in 1951, coupled with the use of labour saving machinery, enabled the use and cultivation of large areas of the Anatolcan platau which had been barren. The state had distributed 174,000 57Harris, op.cit., p. 34. hectares of this land to the peasants bctwecn 1949 and 1951. Turkey had thus bcen able to make use of TL 30m of counterpart funds in dcaling with her refugee problem from neighbouring Bulgaria. Turkey was abi e to integrate these refugees by giying the m land, and settling them in new permanent villages without serious disturbance LO the economy. This was seen as a good imlication of the expanding resources of Turkish agriculture. In facl, President Truman, in a message to the American pcople, had referred to Turkey as one of the best examples of efficiency of American aid, and daimed that Turkey was an example of a country where relatively smaJl investment in agriculture had simply justified itself.
Power and communications had reeeived the second largest share of American dollar aid, which figured even more largely than agriculture in the Turkish governments domestic investment programmc. The road programme had aıready bcgun to show results, and was near completion. Ncarly all the main centres of population within the country were Iinked by roads, and a second road development programme was announced for 1952. American financial aid for road contructions schemes amounted to $18.5m in direct dollar aid, and an equivalent to $13.lm in counterpan funds.
Progress under development schemes in mineral wealth had also been achieved, but had not been as successful as the agricultural field. Russell Dorr, the Mutual Security Programme Administrator, had remarked that Turkey was emering upon 'an cra of economic splendour', referring to the increases in mining production since 1948, which saw an incrcase of 12% in coal, 118% in copper, as a result of investments in the mining industry which amounted to 15%m under the development programıne.
The increase in production of raw exports was aimed to reduce excessive depcndency in spccialised agriculturaI crops, such as dried fruits and hazelnuts, or those whose demand was uncertain, like tobacco. Yet, these stili formed the bulk of exports, which generated the greater pan of Turkey's national wealth. A statistical survey published by the government indicated that gross national income at 1945 prices had risen from TL 8,860m in 1948 to TL lO,630m in 1951, an increase of nearly 20% of which half occurred bctween 1950 and 1951 and which owed its increase greatly to agriculture. Increases in incomes had also bcen depcndent on agriculture, which could potentially have been greater but for Turkey's national defence burden, which took up 34% of the ı95 ı budgel. Although the proportion of national income devoted to defence was only 6% (which was considerably lower than those of most Western European countries), it nevertheless constituted a greater sacrifice in view of the low standard of living.
In 1952, the American aid programme consantmted its efforts towards transport projects, rather than agricultural and industrial schemes, which were, nevertheless, important in view of increased agricultural production, [VOL. XXVII which necessitatcd transport projects, expcnditures on communications ports and storage facilities. As from March ı952, the effects of the Marshall Plan had bccome dearer, in that it had given rise to an enormous investment within Turkey herself, which was estimated to be three to four times the total of American contributions, which itself amounted to over $400m. Although the Turkish economy had expanded and production increascd greatly, Turkey faced the problem of finding buyers for her suplus. At the same time, the increase in her imports which had been induccd by the investment programme left her with a balance of payments deficil. Hence, when she found herself unable to draw upon American credits any longer to cover up her budget deficit, Turkey abandoned liberalisation. 58
The Marshall Aid pro!,'Tamme in Turkeyaimed to devclop the Turkish economy, for her to be able to meet her defence costs without extraordinary outside help. Yet, the persistence of Turkey's balance of payments deficits de spile the two record harvests she had in i95 ıand ı952, and despite the incorning American aid were proof that Turkey had not reached the ability to stand on her own feeL American aid to Turkey would thus continue long after the termination of Marshall Aid.
Turkey fought hard for a greaater share of aid under the European Recovery Programme, but her efforts were of ten rendered futile as a consequence of her inability to express her needs in a more professional fashion. Turkey's anilude towards the ERP was largely deterrnined through her cornparison of the dollars under Marshall Aid to those which she continued to recieve under the Truman doctrine, both in the amount and the method of procurement -which drew reactions from both the Americans and the British. One could state without much hesitation that Turkey could have obtained larger sums of aid under the ERP and pursued a more successful development programme had she spcnt more effort in the utilisation of aid itself as opposed to its acquisilion. Nevertheless, achievements under the Marshall Aid Programme could be seen as a breakthrough for the Turkish economy, which had been stagnant and crippled under heavy military costs. The recovery programme's emphasis over the development of agriculture could be said to have succeeded in raising the standard of living for a large majority of the pcople, but this also meant Turkey depcndcd overwhelmingly upon her agriculture for her national wealth. Thus the Marshall Plan had many posilive effects on Turkey, yet she was stili unable to stand upon her feet by 1952. Moreover, new problems had emerged that necessitated continuing American aid. 58pRO, F0371/107572. Sir Knox Helm to Anthony Eden. 4 Dcccmbcr 1953.
